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 Research on factors affecting adoption of microgeneration technologies in the UK.
 Home resale value is the largest concern amongst microgeneration rejecters.
 Availability of reliable information remains a signiﬁcant barrier for considerers.
 Increasing awareness of household energy self-sufﬁciency would boost uptake.
 Green Deal may have a limited impact on capital cost and home-resale barriers.a r t i c l e i n f o
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The Green Deala b s t r a c t
Microgeneration technologies such as solar photovoltaics, solar thermal, wind and heat pumps may be
able to contribute to meeting UK climate change and energy security targets, but their contribution to
UK domestic energy supply remains low. This research uses a best-worst scaling survey of microgener-
ation adopters, considerers and rejecters (n = 291) to determine the relative importance of different moti-
vations and barriers in microgeneration (non) adoption decisions. The most important motivations are
earning money from installation, increasing household energy independence and protecting against
future high energy costs. Results indicate that the introduction of Feed-in Tariffs has clearly encouraged
a new, more ﬁnancially-motivated, group to install. Financial factors are the most important barriers and
of most importance to rejecters is the prospect of losing money if they moved home. The Green Deal was
introduced to reduce this barrier, but may instead exacerbate the problem as potential homebuyers are
put off purchasing a home with an attached Green Deal debt. The difﬁculty in ﬁnding trustworthy infor-
mation on microgeneration is also a major obstacle to adoption, particularly for considerers, despite
efforts by the government and microgeneration interest groups to reduce this barrier. Self-sufﬁciency
in energy is a more important motivation for those considering or having rejected installation than for
adopters. Provision of accessible information and greater emphasis on household self-sufﬁciency in
energy could help improve the uptake.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Microgeneration is the generation of electricity and/or heat
from a low carbon source [1] at a scale suitable for households.
For example, the UK government limits microgeneration capacity
to 50 kW for electricity and 45 kW for heat. The microgeneration
technologies include solar photovoltaic (PV), micro-wind,micro-hydro, micro-CHP, fuel cells, solar thermal and heat pumps
(air, water and ground source).
The UK government aims to increase uptake in microgeneration
in order to meet climate change and renewable energy targets [2]
and to improve energy security [3]. A number of incentive schemes
have been implemented since 2010 and uptake has increased in
particular for solar PV: from approximately 5000 installations in
2010–400,000 in July 2013 and the total number of microgenera-
tion installations was 520,000 [4,5].
However, the overall contribution of microgeneration in the
domestic sector remains low, accounting for 0.2% of the total
energy supplied to households [4]. Signiﬁcant barriers to wider
404 P. Balcombe et al. / Applied Energy 130 (2014) 403–418adoption exist that must be overcome if microgeneration is to
contribute to UK climate change and energy security targets, such
as high capital costs.
Recent research into the consumer perceptions of microgenera-
tion has identiﬁed many motivations and barriers in the adoption
decision (as discussed in Section 3), but their relative importance
remains unknown. Therefore, this research provides new under-
standing and knowledge of the relative importance of various
motivations and barriers and how this relative importance var-
ies between those who adopt and those who reject microgenera-
tion. This understanding allows recommendations to be made
to policymakers and the microgeneration industry that would
help increase the uptake. For these purposes, we use a sample
comprising existing adopters, those who are considering installing
and those who have rejected it. The speciﬁc aims of the research
are to:
 identify the motivations and barriers associated with the
consumer decision whether to install a microgeneration
system;
 elicit the relative importance of these motivations and barriers
and any differences between adopters, considerers and rejecters;
 identify the differentiating factors between those who adopt
and those who reject installing a microgeneration system; and
 identify improvements that could be made in policy and within
the microgeneration industry and to identify population seg-
ments that would be most affected by them.
In the next section, the paper describes the background to
this research in terms of recent policies that have impacted
on microgeneration uptake and Section 3 gives an overview of
recent research into the factors affecting consumer adoption. This
is followed in Section 4 by a description of the methodology.
Results are presented in Section 5 and a discussion which relates
the research ﬁndings to microgeneration policy appears in Sec-
tion 6. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7, including recommenda-
tions for both policy makers and microgeneration suppliers.2. UK microgeneration policy
A number of policies have been recently implemented to
remove ﬁnancial barriers to microgeneration uptake: the Feed-in
Tariff (FIT) [2], Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) [6] and more
recently the Green Deal [7]. The Microgeneration Strategy [3] also
included a number of measures to remove non-ﬁnancial barriers.
These policy measures and their impact on uptake are described
brieﬂy below. -
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Fig. 1. Feed-in Tariff (FIT) payment rates and the number of installations per month2.1. Feed-in tariffs
The FIT scheme was introduced in April 2010 and offers a ﬁxed
payment to households for every unit of energy they generate by
approved, electricity-generating microgeneration installations;
this is paid for by the household’s electricity supplier. Depending
on the technology, the tariffs were designed to give an annual
return on investment of 5% [8] with the payments guaranteed for
20–25 years.
Since the implementation of FITs, the global solar PV market has
grown signiﬁcantly, leading to a fall in UK installation costs by
approximately 50% by 2012 [4]. Over the same period, there was
a 15% increase in the UK electricity price, further reducing payback
times. In October 2011, the UK Government launched an emer-
gency tariff review and proposed reducing the tariff for small solar
PV by half, to 21 p/kWh [9]. The short notice period given for the
tariff change, approximately 6 weeks, caused much concern within
the industry due to the expected rush to install before the deadline
and the subsequent industry redundancies after this period [10]. A
group of microgeneration suppliers contested this change at the
UK Supreme Court and the tariff change was temporarily rescinded
until April 2012 [10]. As predicted, there was a spike in the number
of installations before, and a sharp drop in installations observed
after the cut (see Fig. 1). The process by which the tariff rate was
changed may also have caused a degree of uncertainty or scepti-
cism amongst potential adopters, adding to the barriers to
adoption.2.2. Renewable heat incentive
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) is an equivalent incentive to
the FIT scheme but for heat generators. However, the RHI is still
not available for the domestic sector – after many delays, it is
expected to be implemented in Spring 2014 [11,12]. While
awaiting the RHI, the Renewable Heat Premium Payment (RHPP)
has been offering a small grant since August 2011: £300 for
solar thermal systems (which typically costs £5000 to install),
£850 for air source heat pumps (costing £6000–10,000), £950
for biomass boilers (£5000–£12,000) and £1250 for ground
source heat pumps (£9000–£17,000). These grants have doubled
for each technology since May 2013 [13,14]. However, house-
holds that are connected to the central gas grid, which represent
85% of the UK housing stock [15], are only eligible for a solar
thermal system grant. This limits the potential uptake of the
scheme, reﬂected in the fact that since the initiation of the
grant, only 9000 new microgeneration systems have been
installed [16,17].0
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for solar PV retroﬁt installations of less than 4 kW capacity [modiﬁed from [4,5].
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The Green Deal, implemented in Jan 2013, facilitates loans for
the capital cost of various energy efﬁciency measures for resi-
dences and businesses. The loans are paid back at a ﬁxed rate with
estimated fuel bill savings resulting from the improvements and
are automatically added to the property’s energy bill [18]. Energy
improvements such as insulation, double glazing and some forms
of microgeneration can be installed by accredited installers, paid
for with a loan from an accredited private loan company. Loan
interest rates are 7–9% and the repayment term is 10–25 years.
The improvement work must be recommended by an accredited
home energy assessor and the Green Deal stipulates that the loan
is permitted only if the monthly repayments are lower than the
predicted fuel bill savings [7].
Thus, the Green Deal seeks to address the capital cost barrier
and eliminate the risk of not recouping the investment as the
repayment is offset against fuel bill savings. However, since the
Green Deal began, uptake has been slow. The number of prelimin-
ary household assessments reached 38,000 by mid-June 2013, but
very few households subsequently applied for Green Deal ﬁnance
(245 applications by June 2013) and none had been implemented
[19].2.4. Microgeneration strategy
The Microgeneration Strategy [3] was published in 2011 and
suggests pathways for the microgeneration industry to reduce a
number of non-ﬁnancial barriers to greater uptake. Such
barriers are concerns about performance and durability and the
availability of trustworthy information and advice. In particular,
the strategy outlined the task of the Microgeneration Certiﬁcation
Scheme (MCS) to ensure that technological and installation stan-
dards were met. The MCS is an accreditation scheme for installers
and technologies, which aims to ensure that any installed product
meets the required set of standards [3]. In order for a household to
receive any of the incentives described above, the microgeneration
technology and installer must be accredited.3. Existing research on the motivations and barriers affecting
adoption
Previous research has identiﬁed a number of motivations and
barriers that affect adoption of microgeneration, including ﬁnance,
environmental concerns, self-sufﬁciency, uncertainty and trust,
inconvenience and impact on residence. These are reviewed brieﬂy
next, as a way of introduction to the research carried out in this
work. For a more comprehensive review, see Balcombe et al. [4].3.1. Finance
Capital cost has repeatedly been found to be the main barrier to
installing microgeneration [e.g. 20,21–24]. For many people, the
capital cost is either unaffordable [22] or they cannot earn enough
money from the installation to warrant the investment [25]. How-
ever, the introduction of the FITs has improved payback time and
the signiﬁcant increase in solar PV uptake suggests that the chang-
ing ﬁnancial landscape has further motivated people to adopt.
There is also concern that the installation will have a negative
impact on the home value: the resale value of the home would
either not increase proportionally with the capital investment, or
would put off potential homebuyers such that the home value
decreases. Currently, there is limited research into the effects of
microgeneration on house resale value [26–28].3.2. Environmental concerns
Many people are motivated to install by the desire to improve
the environment [24,29]. However, a number of studies suggest
that there is little desire from households to pay extra for this envi-
ronmental improvement [24,30–32]. Households may be moti-
vated by the environmental motive to consider installing, but the
decision is more often based on ﬁnancial or other factors than envi-
ronmental beneﬁt [31,33,34]. One other environment-related
motivation to install is to demonstrate environmental commit-
ment to others via technologies which are visible outside the prop-
erty, such as solar panels or wind turbines [35,36].3.3. Self-sufﬁciency
The motivation to increase the household’s self-sufﬁciency in
energy or independence from the central electricity grid is also
important to potential adopters [36–38]. The recent increases in
energy prices have also contributed to a desire to protect against
future price rises [39]. Guarding against power cuts [39] may also
be a motivation but no UK study has considered this within their
research. Recent concerns raised by the UK gas and electricity reg-
ulatory body Ofgem (Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity Markets) regard-
ing the tightening margins between the quantity of electricity
supply and demand within the next two years [40] suggest that
this motivation may become more important as the risk of power
cuts increases.3.4. Uncertainty and trust
There are also barriers to adoption relating to uncertainty over
technological performance of a microgeneration system [35,41–
43] and the suitability of their home [3]. Fuelling this uncertainty
has been the perceived lack of reliable or trustworthy information
[20,44]. Consumers are often unaware of information and advice
centres [3,42] and there is also a lack of trust in suppliers and
installers [3], with numerous examples shared online of poor
installation experiences [e.g. 45] or aggressive product-selling
[32,46].3.5. Inconvenience
Installing a microgeneration system often involves major mod-
iﬁcations to the household heating or electricity system [22,47].
There may also be a change in day-to-day use of the heating/elec-
tricity system, with different technologies requiring different
modes of operation, space requirement (e.g. heat pumps, biomass)
or frequent refuelling (biomass boilers) [22]. Other barriers include
a change in maintenance requirements and complexity of the sys-
tem [48].3.6. Impact on residence
There is a space requirement associated with retroﬁtting house-
holds with some technologies and is a particularly signiﬁcant bar-
rier for smaller households. The zero-carbon homes initiative [49]
eliminates this barrier for new-build homes: by 2016 homes must
either have a microgeneration installation or be connected to a dis-
trict renewable energy system in order to comply [50]. However,
the barrier for the 25 million existing UK homes remains. There
is also an aesthetic impact on the house by installing a microgen-
eration system and concerns are often raised about neighbour dis-
approval [27,42].
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The various motivations and barriers described above may
impact upon a household’s adoption decision, but the extent to
which they impact upon the decision varies considerably across
the population. Although adoption is highest amongst 45–65 year
olds [29,42,51,52], awareness is higher for under 45-year-olds
and they more frequently consider installing [53] but less fre-
quently install [42]. The correlating factors with age that affect
uptake may be the level of available income for investment, house
size or likelihood of moving house [52,54]. A number of studies
also ﬁnd that there is greater adoption amongst those with higher
income and a higher level of education [25,54–57]. A higher
income may somewhat mitigate the capital cost barrier, but the
causality between adoption and education is less clear.4. Methodology
While the studies discussed in the previous section have identi-
ﬁed a number of factors that affect the adoption decision, they did
little to identify how important they are in the adoption decision.
This is the focus of the present research which aims to identify
the relative importance of consumer motivations and barriers
associated with the adoption decision and to identify relative dif-
ferences between adopters, considerers and rejecters across popu-
lation segments. The aim is also to suggest improvements in policy
and within the microgeneration industry that could help to
increase uptake.
4.1. Questionnaire design and data collection
To achieve the above aims, an online survey of adopters, consi-
derers and rejecters has been carried out using the questionnaire
developed as part of this research. To help design the question-
naire, ﬁrst a comprehensive list of motivations and barriers was
identiﬁed through a literature review detailed in Balcombe et al.
[4] and summarised in Section 3. Semi-structured telephone inter-
views were then undertaken with a sample of 12 adopters, consi-
derers and rejecters to reﬁne the list of motivations and barriers.
The interviews lasted approximately 20 min and participants were
asked to describe their interest in microgeneration: what moti-
vated them, what put them off and any background information
related to these factors. While these topics were followed broadly,
the open nature of semi-structured interviews also allowed for
new topics to be discussed, depending on what the interviewees
said. As a result, eight motivations and 14 barriers were identiﬁed
and included in the survey; these are listed in Table 1. The survey
was carried out using the best-worst scaling (BWS) method to helpTable 1
Motivations and barriers considered in the survey.
Motivations
1. Save or earn money from lower fuel bills and government incentives
2. Help improve the environment
3. Protect against future higher energy costs
4. Make the household more self-sufﬁcient/less dependent on utility companies
5. Use an innovative/high-tech system
6. Protect the household against power cuts
7. Increase the value of my home
8. Show my environmental commitment to otherselicit the relative importance of the motivations and barriers in the
adoption decision; BWS is described further below.
The survey was carried out online between October 2012 and
March 2013. Recruitment was undertaken via advertisements
placed on a number of websites and microgeneration forums, as
well as to approximately 20 renewable energy showrooms in the
UK. Leaﬂets were also distributed in neighbourhoods where one
or more property had installed a solar panel – as these were visible
from the outside the property, they indicated clearly the adopters.
Based on the previous research, it was also possible that other
neighbours might be considerers, motivated by their adopter-
neighbours [58,59].
Respondents were asked which of the following statements
applied to them: I have bought a microgeneration system (adopt-
ers); I am currently thinking about buying a microgeneration sys-
tem (considerers); and I have thought about it and decided not to
buy a microgeneration system at this time (rejecters). They were
then asked to complete the BWS survey, which is described in
the next section. The full questionnaire can be found in Supple-
mentary material.
In total, 291 respondents completed the survey with a relatively
even split between adopters (n = 113), considerers (n = 87) and
rejecters (n = 91). Their characteristics are discussed in Section 5.4.2. Best-worst scaling
BWS is a survey method in which respondents are asked repeat-
edly to select the best and worst options (in this case motivations
and barriers) within a set. They make repeated pairs of best/worst
choices, each set with a different combination of options shown.
The choices are analysed to reveal the relative importance or pref-
erence associated with the options, based on random utility theory
(see Section 4.3) and the assumption that the frequency of selec-
tion of an item as best or worst indicates the strength of preference
for that item [60,61].
Fig. 2 shows an example of a choice task used within the survey.
For items A, B, C and D, the selection of A as best and B as worst
suggests that A > (C & D) > B, providing preference orderings on 5
of the 6 possible pairwise comparisons [62]. Repeated choice tasks
with differing motivations or barriers allow an estimate of the
probability that, given a certain set of motivations, item x will be
selected as best and item y as worst, from which the relative
importance of each item can be inferred.
Respondents were asked to complete ﬁve choice tasks for moti-
vations, each comprising four motivations, and seven choice tasks
for barriers, each consisting of ﬁve barriers. The total number of
times each motivation and barrier should appear for each respon-
dent (the number of items per choice set multiplied by the numberBarriers
1. Costs too much to buy/install
2. Cannot earn enough/save enough money
3. Home/location not suitable
4. Lose money if I moved home
5. High maintenance costs
6. System performance or reliability not good enough
7. Energy not available when I need it
8. Environmental beneﬁts too small
9. Take up too much space
10. Hassle of installation
11. Would not look good
12. Neighbour disapproval/annoyance
13. Disruption or hassle of operation
14. Hard to ﬁnd trustworthy information/ advice
Fig. 2. An example subset of motivations taken from the best-worst scaling survey.
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approximately three, in order to produce statistically signiﬁcant
results [63]. Preliminary testing of the survey suggested that 12
choice sets were acceptable without resulting in respondent fati-
gue. The number of items per choice set is typically four or ﬁve
and a study by Orme [63] on the internal validity of such BWS
experiments suggests that there is little advantage in more than
ﬁve items per set. Thus, the survey was designed such that each
motivation and barrier appears approximately the same number
of times for all respondents across all the choice sets: an average
of 2.5 times per person.
As far as we are aware, this is the ﬁrst time BWS has been used
to elicit consumer perceptions of microgeneration. Other studies
have used open ended interviews with qualitative analysis
[36,64], closed format questions or rating scales with descriptive
statistical [e.g. 29,41,42,65] or regression analysis [55]; environ-
mental valuation economic studies have used choice experiments
[22,32] and the contingent valuation method [24,66]. The BWS
methodology was selected over other methods for its suitability
for eliciting importance values over large sets of independent
items. Asking respondents to rank items over large sets has been
shown to prompt greater likelihood of anomalous choice behav-
iour, hence the desire to reduce the cognitive load via small sets.
The cognitive load is further reduced by only asking respondents
to make judgements at the extreme (best/worst) rather than rank-
ing all items shown [67]. BWS also forces the respondent to dis-
criminate between the different items by having to select a best
and worst option, thus respondents cannot simply rate each item
as of ‘middling’ importance, as is the case with agreement scale
methods (e.g. Likert scales). Additionally, there is no scale use bias
associated with the method as respondents do not explicitly rate
each motivation and barrier on an absolute scale which is vulner-
able to systematic differences in respondents tendency to (not) use
certain portions of the scale. BWS also avoids differences in inter-
pretation of terms such as ‘‘very’’ and ‘‘quite’’ often used as labels
in such rating scales. Finally, the random utility models estimated
on BWS data yield ratio-scaled importance scores, rather than just
a rank order, which provide more information and help to under-
stand the results better.
4.3. Data analysis
As mentioned earlier, random utility theory has been used to
reveal the relative importance of preferences. The importance of
each motivation and barrier is expressed as follows [60]:
Ux ¼ Ix þ ex ð1Þ
where Ux is the relative importance of motivation or barrier x, Ix is
the systematic element of importance (the importance levelmeasured within the study) and ex is the unobserved error compo-
nent, which accounts for internal inconsistencies in the choices. Ix is
estimated by making an assumption regarding the error terms
which are independent and identically distributed (iid), i.e. they
all have the same probability distribution.
The best-worst choice tasks are used to estimate the probability
of each motivation or barrier being selected as best or worst, given
a certain subset of motivations or barriers. Probabilities for the dif-
ferent pairs within the subset are then transformed into relative
importance values using the multinomial logit (MNL) rule [68]:
PðxyjCÞ ¼ e
IxIy
PK
1e
IjIk
ð2Þ
where P(xy|C) is the probability that item (motivation or barrier) x is
selected as best and item y is selected as worst within subset C; j
and k are two of the non-selected items in subset C and K is the total
number of pairs of items in subset C. A relative importance value Ux
is estimated for every motivation and barrier except one, which is
the reference value by which to measure the relative importance
of the other items. In this study, the reference motivation was Show
my environmental commitment to others and the reference barrier
was Hard to ﬁnd trustworthy information/advice.
A Hierarchical Bayes (HB) model was used to estimate individ-
ual-level importance scores. Individual-level importance scores
allow us to analyse the variation of importance scores across the
sample, which is an advantage over an aggregate MNL model
(which yields average importance scores over the whole sample).
The survey was designed and data collected and analysed using
Sawtooth software: Maxdiff and CBC Hierarchical Bayes [69]. The
HB model is hierarchical as it is an iterative operation between
two distinct levels of parameter estimation [70]. On the lower
level, individual-level MNL scores are estimated from each individ-
ual’s choice sets. However, there is not enough survey data to fully
estimate each parameter for each individual as this would require
more choice sets for each respondent potentially resulting in a
greater respondent drop-out rate. In order to ﬁll in these informa-
tion gaps, importance values and covariances are taken from a set
of normal distributions from the whole sample: this is the upper
level [71]. The new estimate for the individual-level scores then
allows a new estimate for the upper-level mean importance scores
and covariance matrix. The number of iterations carried out is
speciﬁed (20,000 in this model) and the importance scores are esti-
mated by taking the average values over the iterations (after a
‘burn-in’ period of 10,000 iterations to negate the inﬂuence of
starting values of importance scores and the covariance matrix).
A number of covariates are used in the model in order to
improve estimates of the upper-level normal distribution of impor-
tance values. If a covariate has a signiﬁcant effect on the model the
different covariate values signiﬁcantly alter the prediction of the
Table 2
A summary of the characteristics of the sample, showing the breakdown for adopters, considerers and rejecters.
Variable Total Adopters Considerers Rejecters
Mean Standard error Mean Standard error Mean Standard error Mean Standard error
Which technology have you installed/considered? n = 291 n = 113 n = 87 n = 91
Solar PV 0.85 0.021 0.85 0.034 0.84 0.040 0.86 0.037
Solar thermal 0.44 0.029 0.27 0.042 0.58 0.053 0.52 0.053
Micro-wind 0.18 0.023 0.062 0.023 0.30 0.049 0.22 0.044
GSHPa 0.17 0.022 0.027 0.015 0.26 0.048 0.24 0.045
ASHPb 0.13 0.020 0.12 0.030 0.20 0.043 0.088 0.030
Biomass 0.13 0.020 0.062 0.023 0.23 0.045 0.11 0.033
Micro-CHP 0.048 0.013 0 0 0.10 0.033 0.055 0.024
Micro-hydro 0.024 0.009 0.018 0.012 0.057 0.025 0 0
Income n = 282 n = 106 n = 86 n = 90
<£20,000 0.25 0.026 0.24 0.04 0.28 0.049 0.24 0.046
£20,000–£30,000 0.17 0.022 0.16 0.036 0.22 0.045 0.13 0.036
£30,000–£40,000 0.15 0.021 0.11 0.031 0.16 0.040 0.17 0.040
£40,000–£50,000 0.12 0.020 0.11 0.031 0.14 0.038 0.12 0.035
£50,000–£60,000 0.071 0.015 0.094 0.029 0.035 0.020 0.078 0.028
£60,000–£80,000 0.10 0.018 0.10 0.030 0.058 0.025 0.14 0.037
£80,000–£100,000 0.050 0.013 0.066 0.024 0.047 0.023 0.033 0.019
>£100,000 0.085 0.017 0.11 0.031 0.058 0.025 0.078 0.028
Gender n = 289 n = 111 n = 87 n = 91
1 = Male, 0 = Female 0.79 0.024 0.83 0.036 0.77 0.045 0.77 0.044
Age n = 264 n = 102 n = 78 n = 84
Years 53.9 0.771 55 1.04 51.2 1.56 54.9 1.46
Occupationc n = 281 n = 108 n = 85 n = 88
Employed 0.59 0.029 0.59 0.048 0.58 0.054 0.61 0.052
Retired 0.27 0.026 0.31 0.045 0.20 0.044 0.27 0.048
Student 0.032 0.011 0 0 0.071 0.028 0.034 0.019
Unemployed 0.11 0.018 0.093 0.028 0.15 0.039 0.080 0.029
Educationd n = 291 n = 113 n = 87 n = 91
Bachelor’s degree (or equiv) 0.59 0.029 0.66 0.045 0.49 0.054 0.60 0.052
Master’s degree (or equiv) 0.31 0.027 0.35 0.045 0.24 0.046 0.33 0.050
a Ground source heat pump.
b Air source heat pump.
c Nine types of occupation were considered but only the types for which correlation was found are shown.
d Eight education groups were considered but only the groups for which correlation was found are shown.
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estimate of the effect of the covariate and this may be either posi-
tive (i.e. a change in the covariate from the reference value
increases the importance weight) or negative (decreases the
importance weight). The covariate effect is signiﬁcant if over 95%
of the iterations are either positive or negative [71].5. Results
The sample characteristics are given in Table 2 for the total
sample and the three sub-groups: adopters, considerers and
rejecters. Mean responses are given alongside the standard error
of the mean as a measure of the average variance within the
group. Further detail in the responses can be found in the
Appendix.
The demographic of the aggregate sample was similar to that of
a typical adopter [4,29,42,51,52]. In comparison to the UK 2011
Census data, the sample was older (54 compared to 48 years
old1), educated to a higher level (60% had a Bachelor’s degree or
higher, compared to 27% in England and Wales) and wealthier (med-
ian income £30,000–£40,000 versus the UK average £26,500) [72].
Whilst there is little difference between the adopter and rejecter
groups, considerers are far closer to the national average with a
lower income (median of £20,000–£30,000), age (51 years old) and1 This ﬁgure is derived from the 2011 Census statistics [72] and considering only
those aged 18 or over.level of education than the rest of the sample (although still twice
that of the national average).
It is important to note that these three groups are not static or
necessarily homogeneous in their preferences. Adopters are an
aggregated group who have installed different technologies at dif-
ferent times and perhaps for different reasons. Fig. 3 shows the dis-
tribution of the year of installation or rejection across the sample
of adopters and rejecters indicating that over 75% of adopters
had installed since the FITs were introduced in 2010. Fig. 4 reﬂects
the proportion of the whole sample that considered/installed each
technology. The vast majority of adopters have installed a solar PV
system. Some have installed solar thermal (25%, normally in addi-
tion to a solar PV system) but very few other technologies have
been installed, which is consistent with the current number of
installations of different microgeneration technologies in the UK
[4].
The following sections detail the survey results for the motiva-
tion for and barriers to installing microgeneration in the UK.
5.1. Motivations for installing microgeneration
As described in Section 4.3, choice models were estimated using
an HB technique to elicit importance values for motivations and
barriers, the results of which are given in Table 3. The values
shown are the measure of relative importance given to each moti-
vation, whereby the sum of importance values for each group
always equals 100. The sample was treated in aggregate (adopters,
considerers and rejecters together) as all groups were presented
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Fig. 3. The year of installation for the sample of adopters and the year of rejection for the sample of rejecters.
Table 3
Estimates from the Hierarchical Bayes model of relative importance of each motivation and barrier for adopters, considerers and rejecters, with the standard error of the mean as a
measure of variance.a
Adopters Considerers Rejecters
Mean Standard error Mean Standard error Mean Standard error
Motivations
Make the household more self-sufﬁcient/less dependent on utility companies 23.6 1.04 27.7 0.93 26.3 0.82
Save or earn money from lower fuel bills and government incentives 22.7 0.87 21.0 1.21 25.0 0.85
Protect against future higher energy costs 24.1 0.76 23.1 1.04 26.5 0.64
Help improve the environment 16.6 1.10 15.2 1.43 11.2 1.23
Increase the value of my home 3.7 0.64 2.3 0.55 3.0 0.62
Use an innovative/high-tech system 2.7 0.42 2.7 0.63 1.2 0.38
Show my environmental commitment to others 5.0 0.89 3.5 0.95 2.0 0.61
Protect the household against power cuts 1.5 0.43 4.5 0.74 4.7 0.78
Root Likelihood 0.73 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.76 0.01
Barriers
Costs too much to buy/install 14.5 0.64 18.3 0.55 15.5 0.71
Hard to ﬁnd trustworthy information 11.9 0.70 13.2 0.84 8.1 0.80
System performance or reliability 10.6 0.52 10.5 0.65 8.9 0.61
Cannot earn enough/save enough money 9.4 0.60 12.1 0.77 12.1 0.78
Lose money if I moved home 11.4 1.90 5.5 1.25 18.6 2.96
Home/location not suitable 8.5 0.81 6.0 0.76 8.1 0.94
Energy not available when I need it 8.1 0.65 8.6 0.67 6.9 0.59
Hassle of installation 6.6 0.63 5.0 0.63 4.7 0.63
High maintenance costs 4.9 0.35 8.1 0.54 4.7 0.42
Environmental beneﬁts too small 4.7 0.42 4.1 0.52 5.1 0.65
Disruption or hassle of operation 4.8 0.48 4.4 0.52 2.8 0.37
Take up too much space 1.8 0.25 1.6 0.29 2.6 0.41
Would not look good 1.3 0.30 1.6 0.43 0.9 0.25
Neighbour disapproval/annoyance 1.5 0.37 1.1 0.29 1.0 0.27
Root Likelihood 0.55 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.57 0.01
a Individual importance scores were transformed, rescaled and averaged across each adopter, consider and rejecter group. For each respondent, the raw scores were ﬁrst
zero-centred (a mean score of zero across the set of parameters) by subtracting the mean value from each parameter. Each parameter was transformed using the equation
eUi
eUiþa1, where Ui is the zero-centred importance score and a is the number of items in each set (4 for motivations, 5 for barriers) [63]. Finally, the parameters were rescaled
such that the summation of the parameters equals 100.
P. Balcombe et al. / Applied Energy 130 (2014) 403–418 409with the same motivations and barriers to adoption, in order to eli-
cit importance scores for each respondent, as shown in Table 3. The
individual level scores, as well as individual root likelihood (RLH)
estimates2 [73,74], were then averaged over the adopter, considerer
and rejecter groups to give average group scores. Fig. 5 illustrates
these importance scores of each motivation for each adopter, consi-
derer and rejecter group. The error bars on each estimate represent
the standard error of the mean importance scores (shown in Table 3).
The model ﬁt of the HB models (0.71–0.76 for motivation models
and 0.55–0.57 for barrier models) was judged acceptable [74].2 The root likelihood is a measure of model ﬁt, deﬁned as the geometric mean of the
probabilities of each respondent selecting each choice that they did, given the
estimated model. The maximum theoretical RLH value (a perfect model ﬁt) is 1,
whilst a minimum value (with no model ﬁt, called the null RLH) equates to the
reciprocal of the number of items per choice task [73]. A rule of thumb for acceptance
of the model is a RLH that is double the null RLH value: 0.5 for motivations [4 items
per choice set: (1/4) ⁄ 2 = 0.5] and 0.4 for barriers [5 items per choice set: (1/
5) ⁄ 2 = 0.5] [74].The covariates used for the estimation of models on motivations
were: adopters, considerers and rejecters (3 groups); income (8
groups; see Table 2); age (continuous); level of education (3
groups: no Bachelor’s degree, Bachelor’s degree, Master’s degree
or equivalent); and technology adopted/considered/rejected (4
binary groups3 (yes/no): solar PV, solar thermal, wind and ground
source heat pumps). These covariates were found to signiﬁcantly
affect importance estimates and notable differences are described
below.
As shown in Fig. 5, four motivations are found to be consis-
tently more important than the others, of which three relate to
ﬁnance and independence from power companies: saving or
earning money from the installation, increasing household inde-
pendence and to protect against future high energy costs. The
fourth top motivation, desire to help improve the environment, is3 All technologies were tested as covariates during the analysis but only solar PV,
solar thermal, wind and ground source heat pumps had a signiﬁcant impact on the
parameter estimations.
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Fig. 4. The proportion of adopters, considerers and rejecters who have installed or considered each technology.
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Fig. 5. Hierarchical Bayes estimation of the relative importance of motivations for installing microgeneration for adopters, considerers and rejecters.
410 P. Balcombe et al. / Applied Energy 130 (2014) 403–418consistently below these ﬁnancial motivations, but its relative
importance to them is variable across the three groups. For reject-
ers saving money from lower fuel bills is 2.3 times as important a
motivation as improving the environment, but for adopters and
considerers, it is only 1.4 times as important.
The rest of the motivations matter little relative to the top four
factors, yet there are notable differences among the groups. Protec-
tion against power cuts is far more signiﬁcant an issue for consid-
ers and rejecters than for adopters. Saving money from lower fuel
bills is 15 times more important than such protection for adopters,
but only 5 times more so for considerers and rejecters.
Adopters are more motivated by the desire to show their envi-
ronmental commitment to others, relative to both ﬁnancial and
pure environmental motivations. Hence improving the environ-
ment is only 3.3 times more important than showing that commit-
ment to others for adopters, whilst for considerers and rejecters it
is 4.3 and 5.6 times more important. Saving or earning money is
4.5 times more important than exhibiting environmental commit-
ment for adopters whilst for rejecters it is 12.5 times more impor-
tant (see Fig. 5).
Considerers are less motivated to earn money from the installa-
tion, relative to the other motivations, than rejecters and adopters.
Considerers have a lower income than adopters and rejecters and
the inclusion of income group as a covariate in the model shows
that lower income groups (in particular household incomes of
<£20,000 and £30,000–£40,000) are also 16–21 times lessmotivated to save or earn money from the installation; this is dis-
cussed further in Section 6.1.
Another group signiﬁcantly less motivated by earning money
from the installation are adopters who installed prior to 2010,
the year in which FITs were introduced. These results are shown
in Fig. 6 which illustrates the differences in motivation importance
scores between adopters before 2010 (n = 28) and from 2010
onwards (n = 85). Saving or earning money was 1.7 times more
important than improving the environment for later adopters,
but 1.4 times less important for earlier adopters. Therefore, the
introduction of FITs has created a new group of adopters who exhi-
bit much greater ﬁnancial motivations to install.
Adopters who installed prior to 2010 were also signiﬁcantly
more motivated by showing their environmental commitment to
others. This motivation was twice as important compared to those
who installed since 2010. The motivation to increase the value of
their home was twice as important for the post-FIT adopters,
although still relatively unimportant in the adoption decision
(5 times less important than the top most important motivations;
see Fig. 6).
5.2. Barriers to installing microgeneration
There is a much greater variation of importance values across
the different barriers than motivations, as illustrated in Fig. 7
which shows the relative importance of each barrier to the sample
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Fig. 6. Motivation importance scores for pre- and post-2010 adopters.
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Fig. 7. Hierarchical Bayes estimation of the relative importance of barriers to installing microgeneration for adopters, considerers and rejecters.
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were: adopters, considerers and rejecters (3 groups); income (8
groups; see Table 2); age (continuous); likelihood of moving home
within ﬁve years (5 groups: very likely, fairly likely, no idea, fairly
unlikely and very unlikely); and technology adopted/considered/
rejected (6 binary variables (yes/no): solar PV, solar thermal, wind,
ASHP, biomass and CHP).
Financial barriers (high capital costs, not earning or saving
enough money and the risk of losing money if moved home) were
found to be the most important. For adopters and considerers, the
most important barrier was the high capital cost, which was 50%
more important than not earning enough money from the installa-
tion. Surprisingly, the largest barrier for rejecters was the prospectof losing money if they moved home, 60% more important than for
adopters and 3 times more important than for considerers. The dif-
ﬁculty in ﬁnding trustworthy information is also a signiﬁcant bar-
rier for most and is approximately as important as not earning or
saving enough money from the installation for considerers,
1.3 times more important for adopters and 1.5 times less impor-
tant for rejecters. Aspects of particularly little importance for all
groups were that the system would not look good and concerns
about neighbour disapproval and were between 10 and 17 times
less important than the capital cost barrier.
Both considerers and rejecters are signiﬁcantly more put off
by not saving/earning enough money than adopters: this barrier
was 30% more important for considerers and rejecters than for
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Fig. 8. Barrier importance scores for pre- and post 2010 adopters.
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whilst having increased uptake, have not removed these barriers
from the installation decision.
Using income categories as covariates within the model shows
that the two lowest income groups (<£20,000 and £20,000–
£30,000) are 20–25% more put off by the capital cost barrier.
Another group who were signiﬁcantly put off by the risk of los-
ing money if they moved home are post-2010 adopters (Fig. 8). Rel-
ative to the most important barrier to both pre- and post-2010
adopters – high capital cost – losing money if they moved home
was 4.3 times less important for pre-2010 adopters, whereas for
post-2010 adopters the two barriers are of equal importance. The
latter group were 4 times more put off by potentially losing money
if they moved home than those who installed prior to 2010 (see
Fig. 8). More recent adopters were also far more put off by not
earning or saving enough money from the installation. This is per-
haps synonymous with their greater motivation to save or earn
money, described in Section 5.1.
Adopters who installed before 2010 were far more concerned
about system performance, energy availability and had more difﬁ-
culty in ﬁnding trustworthy information. Relative to the capital
cost barrier, system performance and the information barrier were
approximately as important for the pre-2010 adopters, but 1.3 and
1.5 times less important for the post 2010 adopters, respectively.
The problems in purchasing the system, described by adopters
within the survey and during the telephone interviews, often con-
cerned uncertainty about the potential system performance
because of a lack of accessible or trustworthy information.4 This ﬁgure was estimated from [6], based on the old tariff of 43.3 p/kWh. The new
tariff of 21 p/kWh gives a 4.5% annual return on investment. Payments for electricity
exported to the grid are not included in the estimate because the total contribution of
export payments is small (3% of income from solar PV). Although this contribution
has increased with the increase of export payments from 3 to 4.5 p/kWh, their
contribution is still small.6. Discussion
Having summarised and discussed some of the key ﬁndings on
motivations and barriers, we now discuss the impact of past and
current policies, as well as our ﬁndings’ implications for future pol-
icy and the microgeneration industry.6.1. Motivations for installing microgeneration
The results of the survey for motivations show that improving
the environment is a far greater motivation for adopters than
rejecters (see Fig. 5). Previous research has found the environmen-
tal motive to be an initiator to investigate installing rather than
being a decisive factor in the decision (see Section 3.2). However,
this study clearly identiﬁes it as a differentiating factor between
those who adopt and those who reject.
The FIT scheme has signiﬁcantly increased the earning potential
of electricity-generating technologies, encouraging a new, more
ﬁnancially-motivated, consumer group to install. As this becomes
the main motivation for some to install, other ﬁnancial investment
products become the competition for microgeneration systems
rather than other electricity sources. Such investment products
include bank saving accounts, stocks, shares, bonds and property
investment [8]. However, during the period 2010–2012, Bank of
England interest rates were 0.5% [75], which in turn meant that
savings accounts had low interest rates. Similarly, the property
market [76] and the stock markets were more volatile during the
economic downturn. At the same time, the rate of return on a solar
PV investment reached approximately 10%4 [8]. Thus, aside from
perhaps an early mortgage repayment, solar PV represented a pref-
erable ﬁnancial investment for many. Therefore, regardless of any
other motivations for installing microgeneration, solar panels may
have been chosen mainly for their investment potential.
In 2013, however, the UK ﬁnancial landscape started to change.
Although interest rates remained low, economic growth and house
prices began to increase [76]. This suggests other assets may start
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installations.
Alongside the impacts of any improvement on rates of return on
other investments, FIT rates were reduced in 2012 (roughly by a
half) so that the FIT return fell to less than half of what it was pre-
viously for solar PV: 4.5% [8,77]. Consequently, this consumer
segment (households who regard microgeneration primarily as a
ﬁnancial investment) may be lost unless the ﬁnancial landscape
changes again or the appeal of microgeneration increases. For
example, rejecters are most motivated to protect against future
high energy costs and to make the household more self-sufﬁcient
in terms of energy provision (see Fig. 5) so that uptake by this
group may increase if these aspects improved. For instance, self-
sufﬁciency from solar PV can be maximised using battery storage.
However, this represents an additional upfront cost, which is
already an important barrier to installing microgeneration (see
Section 5.2). Additionally, the FIT incentives offer a sell-back price
for generated electricity of 5 p/kWh, further reducing the ﬁnancial
viability of battery storage. Therefore, without any incentives, the
uptake of batteries will remain low, in turn reducing the potential
of microgeneration to beneﬁt from the self-sufﬁciency motivation
and by implication, from protection of future increases in energy
prices. Recognising this as an issue, the German government
implemented a scheme in May 2013 offering capital grants for
30% of the installation cost and low-interest loans for the remain-
der of the cost to increase the uptake of battery storage [78]. A sim-
ilar scheme could be introduced by the UK government, following
the successful implementation of the FITs, which were also
imported from Germany.
A further action that would help with the uptake of energy stor-
age is provision of clear, impartial information on batteries and
their potential to improve self-sufﬁciency and ﬂexibility of elec-
tricity use as well as their ﬁnancial viability in conjunction with
microgeneration systems. Currently, there is a lack of such infor-
mation, particularly as the incentives landscape and the related
ﬁnancial beneﬁts are very complex, including the FIT scheme and
the Green Deal. This is compounded by the complexity of electric-
ity pricing and numerous deals offered by grid electricity providers
which are very confusing to the consumer [79]. Providing simple
and clear guidance to consumers on the beneﬁts of battery storage
should therefore be a priority for suppliers and installers, in a sim-
ilar manner in which FITs were promoted [e.g. 80,81].
Compared to rejecters, considerers were signiﬁcantly less moti-
vated by earning money from the installation, although this is still
important in the decision (see Fig. 5). Perhaps as this group has a
lower income, they expect lower ﬁnancial gains relative to the
higher-income groups. Considerers are thus likely to be less moti-
vated by the FIT incentives than adopters and rejecters. Therefore,
instead of FITs which offer higher gains but require a high initial
investment, the Green Deal may be more appealing as it lowers
the initial investment whilst resulting in lower ﬁnancial gains
(due to the payback of the loan). The potential effectiveness of
the Green Deal is discussed further in the following section.
6.2. Barriers to installing microgeneration
The results of the survey indicate that, in spite of the numerous
ﬁnancial incentives, the largest barriers are still high capital costs,
not earning enough money and the risk of losing money if they
moved home (see Fig. 7). The latter, the largest barrier for rejecters,
has appeared on some specialist websites [82,83] with a particular
concern being ‘rent a roof’ schemes [84,85], where solar panels are
owned by a third party. This is viewed as a risk to potential home-
buyers as well as mortgage lenders. However, this barrier has
received very little attention in the academic literature with ﬁnd-
ings on the effect of solar PV on resale value being conﬂictingand inconclusive: two studies on house sales in the USA ﬁnd that
house prices increase approximately proportionally with the capi-
tal investment of solar PV [26,27], whereas one study in Oxford,
UK, ﬁnds a negligible difference in house price between those with
solar panels and those households without [28].
The UK government has attempted to address the capital cost
and house resale value barriers with the introduction of the Green
Deal. The risk of losing money if moving home is reduced by the
Green Deal loan as there is no risk associated with an initial outlay.
However, concern has been raised that the ﬁxed loan repayments,
which stays with the home rather than the original occupants, will
put off prospective house buyers resulting in a lower house price
[86,87]. If the house-buyers were lower energy users than the pre-
vious occupants, the monthly repayment (which is ﬁxed at the
start of the term) could be greater than the savings from the
improvement measures, saddling the house-buyers with an addi-
tional bill [88]. A survey conducted by Which? of 2000 UK resi-
dences found that half the sample of potential house buyers
would want the loan to be paid off prior to purchasing [86]. One
ﬁfth of the sample said they would be put off purchasing a prop-
erty if it had a Green Deal attached to it. Thus, the Green Deal
may indeed exacerbate the risk of losing out ﬁnancially if an adop-
ter moved home prior to the end of the payback.
The high interest loan rate of 7–9% has also been criticised for
making the deal unappealing to homeowners [89–91]. A number
of improvements to the Green Deal have been suggested by the
UK Green Building Council, including to reduce the loan interest
rates and to reduce council tax for homes that meet certain energy
efﬁciency requirements [89]. These would both further incentivise
the Green Deal agreement, as well as providing on-going ﬁnancial
incentives for house-buyers considering purchasing a home with
an attached Green Deal.
Other barriers to adoption, particularly for pre-FIT adopters,
were system performance and energy availability concerns, as well
as the difﬁculty in ﬁnding trustworthy information. These barriers
were less of a concern for more recent adopters, as well as reject-
ers, which may be due to the improvement measures put in place
since 2010. The Microgeneration Certiﬁcation Scheme provides
standards for installation and there are signiﬁcant quantities of
technological and performance-related information from the
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), the Energy Sav-
ing Trust (EST), MCS and other interest groups.
In 2011, it was reported in the Microgeneration Strategy docu-
ment that [3, page 38, paragraph 4.2].
‘‘Currently, most householders . . . struggle to identify accurate,
unbiased information. In the absence of a widely recognised source
of impartial advice, anecdotal evidence of previous grant programmes
suggests that investment decisions could be taken based on inadequate
information or even inﬂuenced by mis-selling.’’
Despite the efforts to address this (by DECC, MCS, EST, etc.) ﬁnd-
ing trustworthy information was the second-most important bar-
rier faced by considerers. The barrier was 10% more important
than earning/saving enough money, 25% more important than sys-
tem performance and over twice as great as the barrier posed by
fear of losing money if they moved home. Clearly there remains
a considerable gap between the government’s intention to provide
reliable information to those considering microgeneration adop-
tion, and the experience of these considerers. Addressing this
may be one of most effective and inexpensive means of lowering
barriers to greater microgeneration uptake.
6.3. FITs and the experience of adoption
In order to investigate adopters’ experiences of their microgen-
eration system, they were asked ‘‘If you knew what you know now
at the time of deciding to install, would you do it again?’’
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adopters would either probably or deﬁnitely buy again know-
ing what they knew post-installation. However, many solar PV
adopters also experienced problems with installing. As described
in Section 2.1, the solar PV FIT rate change in 2012 brought about
a rush to install before the payments on new installations reduced.
Several respondents reported that this rush was the cause of poor
quality installation.
A high proportion of considerers and rejecters have also been
affected by the cuts to the solar PV FIT rates in 2012.Manywere con-
cerned that, if they were to adopt, their FIT payment may be chan-
ged. This is a false concern: FIT rate reductions only affect systems
installed after the reduction date and FIT rates remain constant once
the installation is registered. This misinterpretation may be due to
the complicated nature of the tariffs and the uncertainty caused by
the speed and scale of the changes to the FIT rates. The regulation
regarding FIT rate degression began in 2010 as a simple annual per-
centage reduction, but has since been amended to include various
caveats: ‘corridors’, ‘triggers’ and ‘emergency adjustments’, which
are controlled by DECC [92]. In order to increase consumer conﬁ-
dence in the incentives, the regulation framework must be stable,
consistent [20] and transparent. The relationship between changing
the FIT rates and installation costs should be made available and
updated regularly so that consumers can make informed decisions
related to the return on their investment.
Adopters were also asked ‘‘Would you do anything differently
now in terms of technology, installation or using the system?’’
Notably, six out of the seven wind turbine adopters said they
would do something different, with four of these saying they
would not install a wind turbine at all. The main problem experi-
enced by wind turbine adopters was the performance, or lack of
wind to generate from, suggesting they have been installed in an
unsuitable location. Similarly, analysis of the effect of the covari-
ates used within the HB model shows that those who installed or
considered wind turbines, as well as air source heat pumps and
biomass, were more concerned about system performance than
those who installed or considered other technologies. Those who
installed or considered a wind turbine viewed a lack of system per-
formance as equally important as the capital cost barrier, com-
pared to the sample average ﬁgure of 63% of the importance of
capital cost.
The MCS issues sets of standards for the design and installation
of microgeneration systems, in order to ensure installations oper-
ate as designed [93]. As the sample of wind installations in this
study is small (n = 7), further investigation into the experiences
of wind turbine adopters is required in order to assess the effec-
tiveness of the MCS accreditation in this instance. It has been
widely documented that the number of suitable locations for small
scale wind installations is very limited in the UK [94]. Poorly per-
forming installations cause a bad public perception as well as not
contributing to the household, let alone UK climate change and
energy security targets.7. Conclusions
This paper has used best-worst scaling to explore the relative
importance of the motivations and barriers associated with adop-
tion of microgeneration. Of the motivations investigated, three
were consistently the most important: saving or earning money
from the installation, increasing household independence and pro-
tecting against future energy costs. Half as important in the deci-
sion was the desire to help improve the environment. However,
this motivation is far stronger for adopters than rejecters, suggest-
ing it to be a key differentiating factor between those who decide
to install and those who do not.Financial barriers dominate the adoption decision: high capital
costs, not earning or saving enough money and the risk of losing
money if they moved home were very important to all groups.
Considerers also found the difﬁculty in obtaining reliable informa-
tion very important, 10% more so than not earning or saving
enough money from the installation. The microgeneration strategy,
the Microgeneration Certiﬁcation Scheme and the Energy Savings
Trust have all highlighted this barrier and attempted to provide
reliable information in response, but despite this the barrier
remains a signiﬁcant one and must be addressed further. Greater
provision of impartial and more transparent information and
advice may represent the most cost-effective action to help
increase microgeneration uptake.
There are differences in the experience of adoption across tech-
nologies, most notably with wind turbine owners, who often expe-
rienced operational problems such as a lack of wind. The
Microgeneration Certiﬁcation Scheme is aimed at ensuring a cer-
tain level of product and installation quality to avoid miss-selling.
Further work is needed to examine the success of the scheme in
ensuring acceptable wind turbine performances.
The introduction of the feed-in Tariffs (FITs) has increased
uptake by enabling a more ﬁnancially-motivated group to install.
However, the halving of solar PV FITs in 2012 reduced uptake sig-
niﬁcantly and is likely to have impacted most upon the ﬁnancially-
motivated consumer group. The sudden tariff cut also caused a
rush to install prior to its implementation, to which many adopters
attributed poor quality installations. Additionally, the complicated
nature of the FIT degression mechanism has decreased consumer
conﬁdence and caused a misinterpretation of the incentives, with
many fearing that if they were to install, their FIT rate might
change. In order to prevent such negative consequences of tariff
degression in the future, the mechanism to regulate FIT degression
must be simpler, more transparent and regularly updated, allowing
a more informed consumer decision.
If the uptake ﬁgures since the FIT rate reduction are to be
improved, other motivations, such as the desire for energy self-
sufﬁciency, should be focused on and publicised more clearly.
Rejecters in particular are highly motivated to be self-sufﬁcient
or independent from utility companies and to protect against
future energy cost increases. The recent concern over the risk of
an imminent ‘energy gap’ within the next two years may further
add to households’ motivation to be self-sufﬁcient and to guard
against power cuts. In order to increase uptake, the government
and microgeneration industry should focus on promoting and
detailing the beneﬁts of microgeneration in relation to these aspects,
or improving them by increasing the availability of energy when
required. For example, microgeneration suppliers could promote
the use of battery storage with solar PV and highlight the potential
beneﬁts with respect to self-sufﬁciency. An incentive scheme similar
to the recent German capital grant scheme for battery storage would
increase uptake, albeit at an additional government (and taxpayers’)
cost. However, further research is required to determine the eco-
nomic and environmental impacts of battery storage.
The Green Deal is intended to deal with the installation-cost
barrier and the risk of losing money if moving home by providing
a capital cost loan. This may appeal to considerers who have a
lower income and are less motivated by earning money from
incentives as well as rejecters who are most put off by the risk of
losing money if they moved home – one of the largest barriers
identiﬁed in this research. However, the high loan interest rates
and the risk of encountering problems if the home was sold whilst
the loan is still being repaid signiﬁcantly limit the consumer appeal
for the scheme, as demonstrated by the very low uptake rates of
the scheme. The Green Deal would be more appealing if loan inter-
est rates were more competitive and the potential negative effect
of Green Deal ﬁnance on house sale prices should be investigated
Table A1
Summary of answers by adopters.
Variable Participants Mean Standard error
Do you own the system?
1 = Yes, 0 = No 113 0.956 0.019
Installation year
Before 2000 113 0.018 0.012
2004 113 0.009 0.009
2005 113 0.018 0.012
2006 113 0.044 0.019
2007 113 0.062 0.023
2008 113 0.035 0.017
2009 113 0.062 0.023
2010 113 0.13 0.032
2011 113 0.37 0.046
2012 113 0.25 0.041
Those installed since FITs have been available (2010) 113 0.75 0.041
Do/Have you received incentives for the system?
No 113 0.28 0.043
Feed-in tariffs 113 0.65 0.045
ROCs (Renewable Obligation Certiﬁcates) 113 0.018 0.012
Grant (e.g. from the Low Carbon Buildings Programme) 113 0.088 0.027
Other (please describe brieﬂy) 113 0.11 0.029
If you knew what you do now at the time of deciding to install, would you do it again?
Deﬁnitely would 113 0.71 0.043
Probably would 113 0.19 0.037
Not sure 113 0.027 0.015
Probably not 113 0.035 0.017
Deﬁnitely not 113 0.035 0.017
Would you do anything differently?
Nothing 113 0.42 0.047
Do not know 113 0.062 0.023
Yes I would change something... 113 0.52 0.047
Did you encounter any problems during the decision/installation/operation of the system?
No problems 113 0.58 0.047
Problem or difﬁculty when buying it 113 0.11 0.029
Problem or difﬁculty with installing it 113 0.14 0.033
Problem or difﬁculty whilst using it 113 0.19 0.037
Any other problem or difﬁculty 113 0.20 0.038
Table A2
Summary of answers by considerers and rejecters.
Variable Considerers Rejecters
Participants Mean Standard error Participants Mean Standard error
What year did you decide not to install?
Before 2000 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.033 0.019
2004 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.011 0.011
2007 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.033 0.019
2008 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.022 0.015
2009 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.088 0.03
2010 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.077 0.028
2011 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.286 0.048
2012 N/A N/A N/A 91 0.451 0.052
What stage of consideration have you got to?
Initial investigation 87 0.63 0.052 91 0.65 0.05
I have talked others who have installed 87 0.32 0.05 91 0.37 0.051
I have been to see a system in action 87 0.17 0.041 91 0.13 0.036
I received professional advice 87 0.18 0.042 91 0.24 0.045
I received a quote from supplier/installer 87 0.33 0.051 91 0.44 0.052
Other information 87 0.10 0.033 91 0.15 0.038
How likely are you to install?
Almost deﬁnitely will 87 0.14 0.037 N/A N/A N/A
Pretty likely 87 0.33 0.051 N/A N/A N/A
Perhaps 87 0.45 0.054 N/A N/A N/A
Pretty unlikely 87 0.069 0.027 N/A N/A N/A
Almost deﬁnitely would not 87 0.011 0.011 N/A N/A N/A
Are you familiar with the recent cuts to the solar PV FITs?
Yes 77 0.67 0.054 69 0.73 0.054
Vaguely 77 0.23 0.049 69 0.20 0.049
No 77 0.091 0.033 69 0.072 0.031
(continued on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Variable Considerers Rejecters
Participants Mean Standard error Participants Mean Standard error
Have these cuts put you off installing a system?
Made no difference 70 0.3 0.055 64 0.33 0.059
Put me off a little 70 0.49 0.06 64 0.28 0.057
Put me off a lot 70 0.21 0.049 64 0.19 0.049
Put me off completely N/A N/A N/A 64 0.20 0.051
If the cuts have put you off, why?
The changes make it less ﬁnancially beneﬁcial 70 0.6 0.059 64 0.44 0.063
If I bought a system I would be worried about future tariff rates changing 70 0.4 0.059 64 0.44 0.063
The change had not happened when I considered installing N/A N/A N/A 64 0.17 0.048
Other... 70 0.37 0.058 64 0.36 0.06
416 P. Balcombe et al. / Applied Energy 130 (2014) 403–418further. If a negative effect is identiﬁed, the barrier could be
reduced by lowering council tax rates for Green Deal homes or
energy efﬁcient homes in general as is the case with vehicle tax.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the Sustain-
able Consumption Institute for funding this research and Sawtooth
Software for the grant given to use their software for designing and
analysing the survey.Appendix A
(See Tables A1 and A2).Appendix B. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.
05.047.
References
[1] HM Government. Energy act, 2004. Crown Copyright: London; 2004.
<www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/20/contents>.
[2] HM Government. The UK renewable energy strategy, DECC, Editor 2009.
Crown Copyright: London; 2009.
[3] HM Government. Microgeneration strategy, DECC, Editor 2011. Crown
Copyright: London; 2011.
[4] Balcombe P, Rigby D, Azapagic A. Motivations and barriers associated with
adopting microgeneration energy technologies in the UK. Renew Sustain
Energy Rev 2013;22:655–66.
[5] DECC. Monthly central feed-in tariff register, in microsoft excel,
July_2013_Monthly_Central_Feed-in_Tariff_Register_Statistics.xls, Editor
2013. DECC: London; 2013. <www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/
monthly-central-feed-in-tariff-register-statistics>
[6] DECC. Renewable heat incentive, department of energy and climate change,
Editor 2011. Crown Copyright: London; 2011. <https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/48041/1387-renewable-
heat-incentive.pdf>.
[7] DECC. The green deal- a summary of the government’s proposals, department
of energy and climate change, Editor 2010, Crown Copyright: London; 2010.
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/47978/
1010-green-deal-summary-proposals.pdf>.
[8] DECC. Feed-in tariffs scheme: consultation on comprehensive review phase 1 –
tariffs for solar PV, DECC, Editor 2011. Crown copyright 2011: London; 2011.
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/42834/
3416-ﬁts-IA-solar-pv-draft.pdf>.
[9] DECC. Feed-in tariffs scheme: summary of responses to the fast-track
consultation and government response, department of energy & climate
change, Editor 2011. Crown Copyright 2011: London; 2011.
[10] Debenham C. Legal battle over solar feed-in tariff ends in defeat for DECC.
YouGen Blog 2013; 2013. <www.yougen.co.uk/blog-entry/1883/Legal+battle+
over+solar+feed-in+tariff+ends+in+defeat+for+DECC/> [cited 14.09.13].
[11] Nichols W. Green heat industry hits out at renewable heat incentive delay;
2011. <www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jan/21/renewable-heat-incentive-
delay?INTCMP=SRCH> [cited 10.10.12].[12] Nichols W. Green heating scheme delayed again until spring 2014. Guardian
environment network 2013; 2013. <www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/
mar/27/green-heating-scheme-delayed-again-rhi> [cited 27.05.13].
[13] Energy Saving Trust. choosing a renewable technology. Generating energy
2013; 2013. <www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generating-energy/Choosing-a-
renewable-technology> [cited 08.07.13].
[14] Energy Saving Trust. Renewable heat premium payment phase 2 generating
energy 2013; 2013. <www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generating-energy/
Getting-money-back/Renewable-Heat-Premium-Payment-Phase-2> [cited 29.
06.2013].
[15] OFT. Off-grid energy: an oft market study, ofﬁce of fair trading, Editor 2011.
Crown Copyright: London; 2011. <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/market-
studies/off-grid/OFT1380.pdf>.
[16] Energy Saving Trust. renewable heat premium payment scheme: regional
statistics as at phase 1 closure, 2012. Energy Saving Trust: London; 2012.
<www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Publications2/Generating-energy/Regional-statistics-
for-the-Renewable-Heat-Premium-Payment-scheme>.
[17] Energy Saving Trust. Renewable heat premium payment scheme phase 2
statistics as at 18 February 2013. Energy Saving Trust: London; 2013.
<www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Publications2/Generating-energy/RHPP-Phase-
Two-web-stats>.
[18] Dowson M et al. Domestic UK retroﬁt challenge: barriers, incentives and
current performance leading into the green deal. Energy Policy 2012;50:
294–305.
[19] DECC. Statistical release: experimental statistics. Domestic green deal and
energy company obligation in Great Britain, Monthly report March 2013, DECC,
Editor 2013. Crown Copyright: London; 2013. <www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/230138/Statistical_Release_-_Green_
Deal_and_Energy_Company_Obligation_in_Great_Britain_-_20_August_2013.pdf>.
[20] Allen SR, Hammond GP, McManus MC. Prospects for and barriers to domestic
micro-generation: a United Kingdom perspective. Appl Energy 2008;85(6):
528–44.
[21] Element Energy. Potential for microgeneration. Study and analysis, Energy
saving trust. Editor 2005: London; 2005. <www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle27558.
pdf>.
[22] Scarpa R, Willis K. Willingness-to-pay for renewable energy: primary and
discretionary choice of British households’ for micro-generation technologies.
Energy Econ 2010;32(1):129–36.
[23] Bergman N, Eyre N. What role for microgeneration in a shift to a low carbon
domestic energy sector in the UK? Energy Efﬁciency 2011;4(3):335–53.
[24] Claudy MC, Michelsen C, O’Driscoll A. The diffusion of microgeneration
technologies – assessing the inﬂuence of perceived product characteristics on
home owners’ willingness to pay. Energy Policy 2011;39(3):1459–69.
[25] Claudy MC et al. Consumer awareness in the adoption of microgeneration
technologies: an empirical investigation in the Republic of Ireland. Renew
Sustain Energy Rev 2010;14(7):2154–60.
[26] Dastrup SR et al. Understanding the solar home price premium:
electricity generation and ‘‘green’’ social status. Eur Econ Rev 2012;56(5):
961–73.
[27] Hoen B et al. An analysis of the effects of residential photovoltaic energy
systems on home sales prices in California, Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley
National Laboratory, Editor 2011. Environmental Energy Technologies
Division: Orlando; 2011. <eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/lbnl-4476e.pdf>.
[28] Morris-Marsham C. Do solar PV and solar thermal installations affect the price
and saleability of domestic properties in Oxford. In: Bartlett school of graduate
studies, 2010. UCL: London; 2010. p. 63. <www.oxford.gov.uk/Direct/
SolarValueStudyFinalReport.pdf>.
[29] Leenheer J, de Nooij M, Sheikh O. Own power: motives of having electricity
without the energy company. Energy Policy 2011;39(9):5621–9.
[30] Walters R, Walsh PR. Examining the ﬁnancial performance of micro-
generation wind projects and the subsidy effect of feed-in tariffs for urban
locations in the United Kingdom. Energy Policy 2011;39(9):5167–81.
[31] Wimberly J. Banking the green: customer incentives for EE and renewable.
In: EcoAlign; 2008. <www.ecoalign.com/news/releases/banking-green-role-
customer-incentives-energy-efﬁciency-and-renewable-energy>.
P. Balcombe et al. / Applied Energy 130 (2014) 403–418 417[32] Yamaguchi Y et al. Prediction of photovoltaic and solar water heater diffusion
and evaluation of promotion policies on the basis of consumers’ choices. Appl
Energy 2013;102:1148–59.
[33] Hack S. International experiences with the promotion of solar water heaters
(SWH) at household-level, deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) GmbH, Editor 2006: Mexico, City; 2006. <www.conuee.gob.mx/work/sites/
CONAE/resources/LocalContent/6942/1/IEPSWH.pdf>.
[34] Claudy MC, Peterson M, O’Driscoll A. Understanding the attitude-behavior gap
for renewable energy systems using behavioral reasoning theory. J Macromark
2013:1–15. jmk.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/04/11/0276146713481605.
full.pdf+html.
[35] Caird S, Roy R. Adoption and use of household microgeneration heat
technologies. Low Carbon Econ 2010;1(2):61–70.
[36] Palm J, Tengvard M. Motives for and barriers to household adoption of small-
scale production of electricity: examples from Sweden. Sustain: Sci Practice
Policy 2011;7(1):6–15.
[37] Jager W. Stimulating the diffusion of photovoltaic systems: a behavioural
perspective. Energy Policy 2006;34(14):1935–43.
[38] Bergman N et al. UK microgeneration. Part I: policy and behavioural aspects.
Proc Inst Civ Eng: Energy 2009;162(1):23–36.
[39] Praetorius B et al. Technological innovation systems for microgeneration in the
UK and Germany – a functional analysis. Technol Anal Strateg Manage
2010;22(6):745–64.
[40] Ofgem. Electrical capacity assessment report 2013. In: Report to the secretary
of state, Ofgem, Editor 2013. Energy Market Monitoring and Analysis: London;
2013. <www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/75232/electricity-capacity-
assessment-report-2013.pdf>.
[41] Brook Lyndhurst Ltd, MORI, and Upstream, Attitudes to renewable energy in
London: public and stakeholder opinion and the scope for progress, London
Renewables and DTI, Editors. 2003: London; 2003. <legacy.london.gov.uk/
mayor/environment/energy/docs/renewable_attitudes.pdf>.
[42] Ellison G. Renewable energy survey 2004 draft summary report of ﬁndings,
London Assembly, Editor 2004. ORC International: London; 2004. <legacy.
london.gov.uk/assembly/reports/environment/power_survey_orc.pdf>.
[43] Zahedi A. A review of drivers, beneﬁts, and challenges in integrating renewable
energy sources into electricity grid. Renew Sustain Energy Rev 2011;15(9):
4775–9.
[44] Mahapatra K et al. Business models for full service energy renovation of single-
family houses in Nordic countries. Appl Energy 2013;112:1558–65.
[45] Taylor P. Sorting out a solar PV cowboy’s mess. Guest Blog 2013; 2013.
<www.solarpowerportal.co.uk/guest_blog/
sorting_out_a_solar_pv_cowboys_mess_2356>. [cited 10.06.13].
[46] Lonsdale S. Eco living: Beware the ‘solar-panel cowboys’ Property 2013; 2013.
<www.telegraph.co.uk/property/9724311/Eco-living-Beware-the-solar-panel-
cowboys.html> [cited 10.06.13].
[47] Wee H-M et al. Renewable energy supply chains, performance, application
barriers, and strategies for further development. Renew Sustain Energy Rev
2012;16(8):5451–65.
[48] Element Energy. The growth potential for microgeneration in England, Wales
and Scotland, BERR. Editor 2008: London; 2008. p. 12.
[49] HM Government. Energy white paper: meeting the energy challenge, DTI,
Editor 2007, Crown Copyright: London; 2007. <webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/20121205174605/http:/www.decc.gov.
uk/assets/decc/publications/white_paper_07/ﬁle39387.pdf>.
[50] McLeod RS, Hopfe CJ, Rezgui Y. An investigation into recent proposals for a
revised deﬁnition of zero carbon homes in the UK. Energy Policy 2012;46:
25–35.
[51] GfK NOP Social Research. Renewable energy awareness and attitudes research,
DTI. Editor 2006: London; 2006. <webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle29360.pdf>.
[52] Willis K et al. Renewable energy adoption in an ageing population:
heterogeneity in preferences for micro-generation technology adoption.
Energy Policy 2011;39(10):6021–9.
[53] Consumer Focus. Keeping FiT consumers’ attitudes and experiences of
microgeneration, energy saving trust and DECC, Editors. 2011: London;
2011. <http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/ﬁles/2012/04/Keeping-FiT.pdf>.
[54] Mahapatra K, Gustavsson L. Inﬂuencing Swedish homeowners to adopt district
heating system. Appl Energy 2009;86(2):144–54.
[55] Fischer C, Sauter R. Governance for industrial transformation. In: Human
dimensions of, global environmental change. Berlin; 2003.
[56] Keirstead J. Behavioural responses to photovoltaic systems in the UK domestic
sector. Energy Policy 2007;35(8):4128–41.
[57] Bergman N, Jardine C. Power from the people. In: Domestic microgeneration
and the low carbon buildings programme, ECI Research Report No 34, Editor
2009;2009. <www.eci.ox.ac.uk/publications/downloads/bergmanjardine09power
people.pdf>.
[58] Bollinger B, Gillingham K. Peer effects in the diffusion of solar photovoltaic
panels. Mark Sci 2012;31(6):900–12.
[59] Müller S, Rode J. The adoption of photovoltaic systems in Wiesbaden,
Germany. Econ Innov New Technol 2013;22(5):519–35.
[60] Louviere J et al. An introduction to the application of (case 1) best–worst
scaling in marketing research. Int J Res Mark 2013;30(3):292–303.
[61] Finn A, Louviere JJ. Determining the appropriate response to evidence of
public concern: the case of food safety. J Public Policy Mark 1992;11(2):
12–25.[62] Software Sawtooth. The MaxDiff system technical paper in technical paper
series. Utah: Sawtooth Software Inc.; 2013.
[63] Orme B. Accuracy of HB Estimation in MaxDiff experiments, in research paper
series, I. Sawtooth Software, Editor 2005: Sequim, WA 98382; 2005.
<www.sawtoothsoftware.com/download/techpap/maxdacc.pdf>.
[64] Warren P. Uptake of Micro-generation among small organisations in the
camden climate change alliance, in Geography2010, Durham University:
Durham; 2010. <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/764/>.
[65] Curry TE et al. A survey of public attitudes towards energy & environment in
Great Britain, 2005, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for
Energy and the Environment; 2005. <http://www.stanford.edu/~kcarmel/
CC_BehavChange_Course/readings/Additional%20Resources/Sample%20
Intervention%20Docs/Surveys/mit.pdf>.
[66] Baskaran R, Managi S, Bendig M. A public perspective on the adoption of
microgeneration technologies in New Zealand: a multivariate probit approach.
Energy Policy 2013;58:177–88.
[67] Vermeulen B, Goos P, Vandebroek M. Obtaining more information from
conjoint experiments by best–worst choices. Comput Stat Data Anal 2010;
54(6):1426–33.
[68] Marti J. A best–worst scaling survey of adolescents’ level of concern for health
and non-health consequences of smoking. Soc Sci Med 2012;75(1):87–97.
[69] Sawtooth Software Inc. All Products, 2013 11 Nov 2013; 2013. <http://
www.sawtoothsoftware.com/products/all-products>.
[70] Sawtooth Software. CVA/HB technical paper. In: Technical paper series 2003:
Sequim, WA 98382; 2003.
[71] Orme B, Howell J. Application of covariates within Sawtooth Software’s CBC/
HB program: theory and practical example. In: Research paper series, 2009,
Sawtooth Software Inc.: Sequim, WA 98382; 2009.
[72] Ofﬁce for National Statistics. Neighbourhood statistics-census 2011 data;
2013. <neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/instanceSelection.do?
JSAllowed=true&Function=&%24ph=60_61&CurrentPageId=61&step=2&dataset
FamilyId=2514&instanceSelection=132828&Next.x=14&Next.y=18> [cited
20.04.13].
[73] Sawtooth Software. Max Diff utilities calculation with CBC HB V5.2.8 Sawtooth
Software User Forum 2013; 2013. <www.sawtoothsoftware.com/forum/3084/
max-diff-utilities-calculation-with-cbc-hb-v5-2-8> [cited 10.06.13].
[74] Sawtooth Software. The CBC/HB system for hierarchical bayes estimation
version 5.0 Technical Paper. In: Technical paper series, 2009: Sequim; 2009.
[75] Bank of England. Changes in bank rate, minimum lending rate, minimum band
1 dealing rate, repo rate and ofﬁcial bank rate, 2013, Bank of England: London;
2013. <www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Documents/rates/baserate.pdf>.
[76] House Price Crash. Nationwide average house prices adjusted for inﬂation;
2013. <www.housepricecrash.co.uk/indices-nationwide-national-inﬂati on.
php> [cited 08.07.13].
[77] DECC. Feed-in tariffs scheme. Government response to consultation on
comprehensive review phase 2A: solar PV cost control, DECC, Editor 2012,
Crown Copyright: London; 2012.
[78] Clean Technica. Germany’s energy storage incentive to start May 1; 2013.
<cleantechnica.com/2013/04/17/germanys-energy-storage-incentive-to-start-
may-1/> [cited 01.08.13].
[79] DECC. Electricity market reform: policy overview department of energy and
climate change, Editor 2012, Crown Copyright: London; 2012. <https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/65634/
7090-electricity-market-reform-policy-overview-.pdf>.
[80] NHBC Foundation. Introduction to feed-in tariffs, BRE, Editor 2011, IHS BRE Press:
2011. <http://www.nhbcfoundation.org/Researchpublications/IntroductiontoFeedin
TariffsNF23/tabid/437/Default.aspx>.
[81] Energy Saving Trust. Generating your own energy – an overview of what’s
available. 2012 July 2012; <www.energysavingtrust.org.uk/Generate-your-
own-energy/Overview-of-what-s-available>.
[82] Brignall M. How solar panels can dimmortgage prospects. The guardian; 2012.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2012/mar/23/solar-panels-dim-mortgage-
prospects> [14.01.13].
[83] Debenham C. Do solar panels affect house sales? YouGen Ltd; 2010. <http://
www.yougen.co.uk/blog-entry/1546/Do+solar+panels+affect+house+sales’3F/>
[cited 19.12.12].
[84] Lambert S. House hunters warned against buying homes with free solar
panels ﬁtted. This is money; 2012. <http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/
mortgageshome/article-2130985/RICS-warns-house-hunters-buying-homes-free-
solar-panels-ﬁtted.html> [cited 20.05.13].
[85] Rowley E. Renting out roof to solar power ﬁrms could make your home harder
to sell, surveyors warn. The telegraph; 2011. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
ﬁnance/newsbysector/energy/8856365/Renting-out-roof-to-solar-power-ﬁrms-
could-make-your-home-harder-to-sell-surveyors-warn.html> [cited 14.01.13].
[86] Bachelor L. Green deal debt may have to be repaid before property sold; 2013.
<www.guardian.co.uk/money/2013/may/19/green-deal-debt-repaid> [cited
31.05.13].
[87] Newman C. Is the Green Deal right for me? YouGen Blog 2013; 2013. <www.
yougen.co.uk/blog-entry/2117/Is+the+Green+Deal+right+for+me’3F/> [cited
30.05.13].
[88] Booth AT, Choudhary R. Decision making under uncertainty in the retroﬁt
analysis of the UK housing stock: implications for the Green Deal. Energy Build
2013;64:292–308.
[89] King P et al. Open letter Re: ensuring success for the green deal and the
retroﬁt agenda 26 June 2013, DECC, Editor 2013, UK Green Building Council:
418 P. Balcombe et al. / Applied Energy 130 (2014) 403–418London; 2013. <www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q= &esrc=s&frm=1&source
=web&cd =1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F www.ukgbc.o rg%2Fs
ystem%2Fﬁles%2Fprivate%2Fd ocuments%2F13062 6%2520Green%2520 Deal%2520
open %2520letter%2520-% 2520Ed%2520Davey. pdf&ei=ag14UoaKI 4bR0QW-
p4HQCw&usg=AF QjCNF_fnV91HmTZRj26poq nLfz8FimOw& bvm=bv.55819444,
d.d2k>.
[90] Carrington D. Cavity wall insulations crash by 97% following green deal
introduction; 2013. <www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/29/cavity-
wall-insulations-crash-green-deal> [cited 31.05.13].
[91] Hickman L. Older and disabled people ‘put off’ energy efﬁciency schemes;
2013. <www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2013/may/02/older-disabled-people-
put-off-energy-efﬁciency> [cited 31.05.13].[92] Feed-in Tariffs ltd. Feed-in tariffs. Contingent degression: corridors, triggers
and levels 2013; 2013. <http://www.ﬁtariffs.co.uk/eligible/levels/contingent/>.
[05.09.13].
[93] DECC, Requirements for contractors undertaking the supply, design,
installation, set to work commissioning and handover of micro and small
wind turbine systems, in Microgeneration Installation Standard, 2008, DECC:
London.
[94] Energy Saving Trust, Location, location, location. Domestic small-scale wind
ﬁeld trial report, 2009: London.
